Project #60384 - microeconomic

Game theory II

 

Answer the following questions using this week’s required readings (see last lecture slide) and additional research.

 

1.     Suppose that two players are bargaining over $1. The game takes place in rounds, beginning with Round 1. The game ends when an offer is accepted. Player 1 makes offers in odd-numbered rounds and Player 2 makes offers in even-number rounds. The players can either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the offer. At the end of each round $0.20 is removed from the pool of money (as punishment for not reaching agreement). If an agreement is reached in Round 2, the total pool of money is £0.80. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.

 

 

2.     Which are the different coordination games you know? Create a matrix for each of these games and explain the game’s main characteristics.

 

 

3.     What is the Tit-for-tat strategy?                                                           

 

 

4.     What is the Folk Theorem?

                                                                                                                      

 

5.   Explain the prisoner’s dilemma and provide a matrix-form representations. Outline three solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma.

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Due By (Pacific Time) 03/03/2015 12:00 pm
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